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VIETNAMESE FISHERMENASS 'N V
CALIFORNIA DEPAR7MENT OF FISH AND GAME.
SHOULD REGIONAL FISHERY COUNCILS
DETERMINE EEZ PREEMPTION
OF STATE LAWS?
Teresa M. Cloutier*
[There is an] old adage about the two greatest lies ever
told. The first one is 'The check is in the mail,' and the
second one is 'I'mfrom the FederalGovernment and I'm
here to help you. '"
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1976, Congress enacted the Magnuson Fishery Management
Conservation and Management Act (MFCMA),2 creating a national
program for the conservation and management of U.S. fishery resources.
The Act established regional management councils to manage all fisheries
located in waters beyond the states' marine boundaries. Under the
MFCMA, state authority in federal waters is limited to the regulation of
state-registered vessels. Since the passage of the Magnuson Act, several
states have attempted to exercise this authority and regulate fishing
activity outside of their territorial waters. These attempts have raised
fundamental questions concerning the limits of permissible state authority
under the Magnuson Act.

* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1996.
1. West CoastFisheryManagement, Hearingson H.R. 2351 Before the Subcomm.
on Fisheriesand Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on
MerchantMarine and Fisheries,98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 160 (1983) (statement of Sen.
Breaux).
2. Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 18011882 (1988) (prior to 1980, this Act was known as the Fishery Conservation and

Management Act [hereinafter MFCMA]).
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In its decision in Vietnamese Fishermen Ass' of America v.
CaliforniaDepartmentof Fish & Game,' the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California joined a line of decisions narrowly
interpreting the extent of state authority over fisheries in federal waters.'
The court held that extra-territorial enforcement of a California ban on
gillnetting for rockfish was preempted by federal groundfish regulations
allowing such gillnetting in those waters. This casenote will argue that
there are two problems with the decision. The first problem lies in the
court's reduction of the role of state fisheries management by finding an
actual conflict by implication at a time when all management agencies
should be working together to protect fish stocks. The second problem
arises from the decision of the court to give deference to an unappealable
consistency determination by a body containing inherent conflicts of
interest. These problems reflect the court's failure to properly balance
its analysis under the Supremacy Clause with fundamental concerns
stemming from the concepts of federalism and due process. As a result,
the court unjustifiably prevented a state from protecting a fishery in
which it had a legitimate interest.
II. STATE EXTRA-TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER FISHERIES

A. Pre-MagnusonAct
Prior to 1976, fishery management was carried out largely by the
states. The federal government, although claiming control over fisheries
up to twelve nautical miles from its coast by 1966,1 and possessing broad
powers to regulate fisheries under the Constitution, 6 limited its role in
offshore fisheries management. 7 Due to this federal inaction, the states,

3. 816 F. Supp. 1468 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
4. See infra notes 10-11.
5. Eldon V.C. Greenberg & Michael E. Shapiro, Federalism in the Fishery Con-

servationZone: A New Role for the States in an Era of FederalRegulatory Reform, 55
S. CAL. L. REV. 641, 648-649 (1982) (citing Bartlett Act, Pub. L. No. 89-658, 80 Stat.
908 (1966) (repealed 1977)).
6. Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 645 (citing federal power to regulate
interstate and international commerce under U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 as well as the
power to make treaties under U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.).
7. As noted by one commentator:
The federal role in offshore fisheries management, in the face of uncertainty
about state or local jurisdiction, was largely limited to a few domestic
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acting under their police powers, "were the only governmental units with
comprehensive fishery management programs" covering offshore waters.'
The passivity of the federal government in questions of fishery
management was reflected by the fact that state regulation often extended
beyond the state's territorial three-mile limit.9 In extending their
regulations to cover activities in federal waters, however, states had to
meet certain standards to survive judicial scrutiny. For such an
extension to be constitutionally valid, a state needed to meet three basic
requirements. First, a state regulating fisheries in the high seas needed
to show its legitimate state interest in such extra-territorial regulation."0
Second, a state also had to assert sufficient personal jurisdiction over
individuals operating beyond the territorial sea." Third, the state

initiatives, the negotiation and implementation of international fisheries
agreements, including occasional enforcement-related inspections under such
agreements; data gathering; and enforcement against foreign fishermen
encroaching on the areas under exclusive United States control.
Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 641-642. "Until enactment of the FCMA in
1976, the Federal Government did no more than act as a passive partner or custodian of
the [nine-mile] contiguous zone beyond the state's territorial three-mile limit." Arthur
J. Tassi, Fishery Conservation and ManagementAct of 1976: An Accommodation of
State, Federal,and InternationalInterests, 10 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 703, 705 n.5
(1978).
8. Tassi, supra note 7, at 704 n.5.
9. Id. As states began to regulate fishing outside their territorial waters: "mhe
legislatures of coastal states recognized that the geographical mobility of both fish stocks
and fishermen hampered the effectiveness of regulations applying inside the territorial
sea." John Winn, Alaska v. F/V Baranof: State Regulation Beyond the TerritorialSea
After the Magnuson Act, 13 B. C. ENrvL. AFF. L. Rnv. 281, 283 (1986).
10. Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422, 430 (1936) (holding
enforcement to be a legitimate state interest); Felton v. Hodges, 374 F.2d 337, 339 (5th
Cir. 1967) (holding conservation to be a legitimate state interest).
11. Three bases were found to be sufficient to support such jurisdiction: state
citizenship, see Skiriotes v. Fla., 313 U.S. 69, 75 (1971) (State properly regulated
behavior of Florida sponge fisherman on the high seas as state had legitimate interest in
fisheries management and there was no conflicting federal legislation); landing laws, see
Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. at 422, 426 (landing of fish sufficient
contact with the state for the state to rely on in securing jurisdiction over fishermen);
and, minimum contacts between a nonresident and the forum state, see State v. Bundrant,
546 P.2d 530, 552 (Alaska 1976) (having Alaska commercial fishing licenses or state
vessel and gear registrations, using Alaska warehouses to process their catch, or
receiving fuel, repairs, or other assistance in Alaska sufficient contacts to justify the
assertion of state jurisdiction over noncitizens outside state waters). See also Greenberg
& Shapiro, supra note 5, at 652.

258

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1:255

regulation had to overcome constitutional restrictions as imposed by the
Commerce Clause,"2 the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 3 and the

Supremacy Clause. 4

Notwithstanding these constitutional hurdles,

before the passage of the Magnuson Act, "state fisheries management

was the rule, not the exception,"1 " and "the activities of domestic
fishermen operating on both the territorial and high seas were subject
primarily to state scrutiny."16
B. Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act

In 1976, the U.S. Congress enacted the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act 17 out of concern for the "rape" of
American fisheries by foreign fishing fleets.'1 Diplomatic efforts had not
succeeded in preventing the depletion of the stocks off the coast of the
United States. 9 Enforcement of those international agreements that did
exist was lacking.' Congress also realized that a twelve-mile zone was

inadequate if it wanted to protect its most valuable species from
overfishing.2 ' Conflicts between state governments, as they attempted to

manage the fish stocks migrating across their boundaries, provided
another impetus for the Act. '
Presidential Proclamation created a two hundred nautical mile zone
of federal authority by establishing the Exclusive Economic Zone

12. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8,cl. 3.
13. U.S. CONST. art. 4,§ 2, cl. 1.
14. U.S. CONST. art. 6,cl. 2. Supremacy Clause challenges before the Magnuson Act usually pitted federal "rights" granted through vessel licenses against state
management regulations. See, e.g., Douglas v. Seacoast Products, 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
For a more thorough discussion of the constitutional restrictions on state extra-territorial
jurisdiction before the Magnuson Act, see Winn, supranote 9, at 293-297 and Greenberg
& Shapiro, supra note 5, at 654-657.
15. Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 649.
16. Winn, supra note 9,at 283.
17. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
18. 136 CONG. REc. S14,963 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Hollings explaining why the Magnuson Act was originally enacted).
19. Winn, supranote 9,at 297 (citing H.R. REP. No. 445, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
1, 42 (1976)).
20. Id. at 297.
21. Id.at 298.
22. Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 658.
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(EEZ).' The EEZ extends two hundred nautical miles from the baseline
from which the territorial sea is measured.24 All fish in this zone are
subject to the exclusive fishery management authority of the United
States.' The MFCMA also established eight regional fishery management councils' to prepare fishery management plans (FMPs) for each
species of fish within their regions according to seven national
standards.'
These plans are to be reviewed by the Secretary of
Commerce before implementation.'
The voting membership of the regional councils consists of the
principal state official with marine fishery management responsibility
within each affected state, the regional director of the National Marine
Fisheries Service for the geographic area concerned, and individuals
appointed by the Secretary of Commerce from a list provided by the
Governors of each affected state.29 The state representation provided for
by this scheme, coupled with the fact that councils may "incorporate ...
relevant fishery conservation and management measures of the coastal
states nearest to the fishery"3 in creating FMPs, indicate "congressional
intent that the federal planning process, and not local planning efforts,
would primarily respond to local needs." 3"

23. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10605 (1983) (for convenience, the full
text of the Proclamation is reprinted in the notes to 16 U.S.C. § 1453 (1988)).
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1988).
25. Id. This assertion ofjurisdiction brought approximately twenty percent of the
world's fisheries within the control of the United States. Greenberg & Shapiro, supra
note 5, at 658 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. OCEAN POLICY INTHE 1970's:
STATUS AND ISSUES, pt. 111, at 18 (1978)).

26. 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (1988).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 1851 (1988). These standards require: 1) the prevention of
overfishing and the achievement of continuous optimum yields, 2) the use of the best
scientific information available, 3) the management of stocks as a unit, throughout their
range, 4) that conservation and management measures not discriminate between residents
of different states and that allocation is fair and equitable to all fishermen, reasonably
calculated to promote conservation, and carried out in a manner that no one receives an
excessive share of the resource, 5) that conservation and management measures promote
efficiency yet not have economic allocation as its sole purpose, 6) that variations among
and contingencies in fisheries and catches be taken into account, and 7) that costs be
minimized and unnecessary duplication be avoided. Id.
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1854 (1988).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b) (1988) (other nonvoting members are listed in subsec.

c).
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(b)(5) (1988).
31.

Greenberg & Shapiro, supranote 5, at 668.
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The Magnuson Act recognizes state fisheries management jurisdiction
over the waters from zero to three miles offshore32 as well as over
Nantucket Sound33 and certain waters off southeastern Alaska.' A state

may regulate fishing beyond its three-mile zone only when the vessel
involved is registered under its laws.3 Notwithstanding this provision,
several state attempts to regulate state-registered vessels in the EEZ have
failed the constitutional tests traditionally applied to extra-territorial
regulation.36
The most difficult obstacle to state regulation of EEZ fishing
activities has been the argument that the MFCMA has preempted the

possibility of such regulation. Courts have defined the extent of such
federal preemption in two ways. One interpretation, developed by the
eleventh circuit in Southeastern Fisheries Ass'

v. Chiles,3" is that

whenever state extra-territorial jurisdiction is not explicitly preempted by
the MFCMA, it is nevertheless implicitly preempted. The Chiles court
held that Congress intended to occupy the field of fishery management
in the EEZ. The court pointed out that the MFCMA created a zone

within which the federal government has sovereign rights over fishery
resources, provided the states with a management role through the

32. "[Tlhe jurisdiction and authority of a State shall extend-(A) to any pocket
of waters that is adjacent to the State and totally enclosed by lines delimiting the
territorial sea of the United States pursuant to the Geneva Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone..." 16 U.S.C. § 1856 (a)(2)(A) (1988).
33. 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a)(2)(B) (1988). Vineyard Sound was held to be part of
the jurisdiction contained in this subsection. Davrod Corp. v. Coates, 971 F.2d 778, 787
(1st Cir. 1992).
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a)(2)(c) (1988). This jurisdiction extends only "for the
purpose of regulating fishing for other than any species of crab." Id.
35. 16. U.S.C. § 1856(a)(3) (1988). This section substantially restricts preMFCMA extra-territorial jurisdiction allowed to the states. It does not allow either direct
regulation or indirect regulation (e.g., landing laws). Regardless of any legitimate state
interest in the fish in question or the state citizenship/minimum contacts of the alleged
offenders, states may not regulate fishing extra-territorially unless the vessel involved is
registered under their laws. See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n v. Chiles, 979 F.2d 1504 (11th Cir.
1992); Bateman v. Gardiner, 716 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Fla. 1989); Raffield v. State, 565
So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1990). These cases were Commerce Clause and Equal Protection
Clause challenges to extra-territorial regulation of fishing activities by the states.
Successful post-Magnuson Act challenges, however, have not tended to include
arguments based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause. This casenote will be
discussing only those challenges based on the Supremacy Clause.
37. 979 F.2d 1504 (11th Cir. 1992).
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councils, and placed the ultimate responsibility for the management of
the resources on the Secretary of Commerce.38 Therefore, the court
concluded, Congress left nothing pertaining to the EEZ for the states to
regulate.39 The reasoning of the Chiles court, that section 1856(a) of the
MFCMA only allows "state regulation of vessels ... fishing in state

territorial waters" because Congress did not intend to "leave the door
open for state regulation in the EEZ," is somewhat anomalous.'"
More typically, courts have followed a second approach and refused
to hold that all state extra-territorial regulation is preempted by the
MFCMA. In most instances, states have been allowed to regulate
fisheries in the EEZ when no federal regulations covering the fisheries
have been promulgated. 4 In cases where the MFCMA has been held to

preempt state regulation, courts have relied on findings that the state law
actually conflicts with an existing FMP 42 because first, it is impossible
38. Id. at 1509.
39. Id.
40. The court in Tingley v. Allen held that all state authority outside the three-mile
limit was preempted by the MFCMA, regardless of where the vessel in question is
registered. 397 So. 2d 1166, 1168 (Fla. Ct. App. 1981). This holding was overruled.
Livings v. Davis, 465 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1985) (holding that a state can regulate fishing
activities of its citizens beyond its territorial waters when there is no conflict with a federal regulatory scheme; that the FCMA recognizes continued state jurisdiction over
vessels registered under their laws; and that language to the contrary in Tingley is
disapproved).
41. See Anderson Seafoods, Inc. v. Graham, 529 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Fla. 1982)
(upholding state statute prohibiting use of purse seine within or without the waters of the
state as applied to fishermen with vessel registered in state operating beyond state
territorial boundary); State v. F/V Baranof, 677 P.2d 1245 (Alaska 1984) (allowing state
regulation of king crab harvesting in the EEZ when no federal plan had been
promulgated concerning king crab); People v. Weeren, 607 P.2d 1279 (Cal. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980) (upholding state assertion of penal jurisdiction when
defendant used a state-licensed vessel to take swordfish in EEZ in violation of state
regulations and no federal regulatory plan for swordfish had been implemented); State
*ofFla. Dep't of Natural Resources v. Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n, 415 So. 2d 1326
(Fla. Ct. App 1982) (where there is no federal plan covering the use of fish traps, state
statute banning the use of traps or possession of fish caught by traps not preempted by
MFCMA when applied extra-territorially).
42. Preemption does not have to be based upon an actual conflict between federal
and state regulations. Preemption may be based upon an explicit expression by Congress
of its intent to preempt state law. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1976).
Congress may also implicitly preempt state law by indicating an intent to preempt all law
in a particular field. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S.
707, 713 (1985).
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to comply with both regulations,43 and/or second, the state regulation
frustrates the underlying policies behind the MFCMA 4 No case has
rested solely on the first ground.4 5 The substance of these cases seems
to be that state regulation of fisheries governed by an FMP thwarts
Congress' intent to regulate fisheries consistently, under national
standards.'
III. VIETNAMESE FISHERMENASS'N OF AMERICA V.
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME47

A. Background
In 1990, fifty six percent of California's voting population approved
Proposition 132,1 a constitutional amendment designed to phase out gill
net fishing in state waters off Southern California. 49 Gill nets are

43. Bateman v. Gardiner, 716 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (where federal
regulation allows plaintiff to take shrimp in the disputed area and state regulation does
not, it is impossible to comply with both regulations; therefore state law is preempted).
44. Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n v. Mosbacher, 773 F. Supp. 435, 440 (D.D.C.
1991); Bateman v. Gardiner, 716 F. Supp. at 595; State v. Sterling, 448 A.2d 785, 787
(R.I. 1982).
45. See cases cited infra note 46. The First Circuit, in a case not involving the
MFCMA, treated a similar "impossibility" argument as mere semantics. The court held
that it is not impossible to comply with federal and state regulations of a fishery unless
it is physically impossible to do so. Then, the court focused its preemption analysis on
the extent to which the state regulation conflicted with underlying federal policy. Tart v.
Mass., 949 F.2d 490 (1st Cir. 1991).
46. These cases all invalidate state laws setting stricterstandards than the federal
plan. Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n v. Mosbacher, 773 F. Supp. at 435 (holding that state
landing law limiting number of fish landed to a quantity below the allowable federal
catch interfered with FCMA's goal of effective fishery conservation and management
under national standards); Bateman v. Gardiner, 716 F. Supp. at 595 (finding Florida
prohibition of shrimping to frustrate purpose of FCMA in promoting domestic
commercial fishing); State v. Sterling, 448 A.2d at 785 (state landing law conflicts with
federal yellowtail flounder policies where federal regulations governing the fishing of
yellowtail flounder were in effect).
47. 816 F. Supp. 1468 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
48. CAL. CONST. art. X-B, §§ 1-16 (1994) (Marine Resources Protection Act of
1990).
49. Proposition 132 banned the use of gill nets within three miles of the California
coast by 1994. Marine Resources Protection Act of 1990, CAL. CONST. art. X-B, § 3.
See also Fishermen Sue State Over Ban on Gill Netting, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar.
31, 1993, at A5.
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monofilament nets which fish are unable to see and avoid. Proponents
of Proposition 132 see them as indiscriminate, trapping seals, dolphins
and diving birds as well as the fish which they are designed to capture.50
Proposition 132 placed an immediate prohibition on the use of gill and
trammel nets to take rockfish in state waters from zero to three miles
offshore. The possession and receipt of rockfish were also prohibited.
Beginning on March 1, 1991, the California Department of Fish and
Game sought to enforce this ban in federal waters up to two hundred
miles offshore. 1
Fishery management plans for federal waters off the coast of
California are implemented by the Pacific Fishery Management Council.
Prior to the passage of Proposition 132, the Pacific Council promulgated
a plan dealing with rockfish in the EEZ. The Pacific Coast Groundfish
Plan (Plan) allows the taking of rockfish with gill and trammel nets in
the EEZ, except in areas north of thirty eight degrees north latitude.5 3
It also provides a review procedure whereby a state may petition the
Pacific Council for a determination that a state regulation is consistent
with the Plan, thereby enabling the state to enforce that regulation in the
EEZ.54

50. Tony Perry, Suit to Overturn Gill Net BanDismissed; Judge Rejects Fishing
Industry's Claims thatProposition132 is UnconstitutionalBecause the Public WasMisled
About the Danger to Porpoises, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 12, 1994, at A22. Gill nets are
described as "killing machines" that have trapped thousands of porpoises, dolphins, sea
lions, sea otters and sea birds. Id. The indiscriminate nature of gilnetting is not only
opposed by environmentalists, but also by local sportfishermen. "Imagine some hunters
stringing up a 1Ih-mile-long net in the forest and taking everything that walked into it....
Imagine the public outcry over that. This is the same thing, but it's in the ocean." Ed
Zieralski, Gill-net LawsuitDivides Fishermen, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-Tam., Apr. 2, 1993,
at D4 (statement by Michael Von Quilich, past President of the San Diego Rod and Reel
Club). There is dispute over this characterization of gill nets. For example, a Los
Angeles Times article reported:
The gill netters say the environmentalists have confused [gillnetters] with the
tuna seiners whose huge nets surround a school of surface-swimming tuna and
sometimes catch other creatures. Gill nets are generally allowed to settle
near the bottom of the ocean in pursuit of halibut, white sea bass, barracuda,
yellowtail and other species.
Perry, supra.
51. Vietnamese Fishermen Ass'n of Am. v. Cal. Dep't of Fish & Game, 816 F.
Supp. at 1469.
52. 50 C.F.R. §§ 663.1-663.29 (1990).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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According to an early opinion by the California Attorney General,
there was substantial doubt concerning the enforceability of the gill net
ban in federal waters.55 The Chief Legal Advisor for the California
Department of Fish and Game (CDFG) was in agreement, and pursuant
to his advice, the Department of Fish and Game petitioned the Pacific
Council for a determination concerning Proposition 132's consistency
with federal rockfish regulations.5 6 A subsequent letter was sent to the
Council stating that the Attorney General's Office had reconsidered the
matter and determined that the ban did extend to the EEZ.1 On the
strength of the Attorney General's new legal opinion, the CDFG
informed gill and trammel net permittees that the provisions of
Proposition 132 would be enforced in the EEZ.5 8 At a public meeting,
the Pacific Council stated that it did not have enough information to
determine whether Proposition 132 was consistent with the Groundfish
Plan.59 The issue was scheduled for reconsideration at the Council's next
meeting.1
The Vietnamese Fishermen's Association, "a group of boat owners,
pilots and/or crewmen from the greater San Francisco and Monterey Bay
areas," 6' challenged the validity of the CDFG's enforcement actions in
federal waters in the District Court for the Northern District of
California. These fishermen use gill nets to take only rockfish. As the
Vietnamese community in the area was the principal group taking
rockfish, the ban hit them especially hard. 2
On March 18, 1991, the court granted plaintiffs' motion for a
temporary restraining order enjoining the Department of Fish and Game
from enforcing Proposition 132, with respect to its rockfish provisions,
in federal waters. 3 On April 1, 1991, the court granted plaintiffs'

55. Vietnamese Fishermen Ass'n of Am. v. Cal. Dep't of Fish & Game, 816 F.
Supp. at 1471. CDFG also asked for a determination concerning the permissible distance
within which the state could enforce Proposition 132 if it was found to be consistent. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.at 1471-1472.
58. Id.at 1472.
59. Id.
60. Id.

61. Id.at 1469.
62. Id.

63. Id. at 1472. Committee to Ban Gill Nets, Dolphin Connection, Earth Island
Institute, Doris J. Allen and Leo T. Cronin were granted their motion to intervene in late
March. Id.
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motion for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the ban in
federal waters. The parties agreed that the matter in dispute depended
on a consistency determination by the Pacific Council. The preliminary
injunction was to remain in effect until further notice by the court.'
After holding two hearings and several meetings on the issue and
hearing from plaintiffs, intervenors and the CDFG, the Pacific Council
voted that the disputed provisions of Proposition 132 were inconsistent
with its FMP. The CDFG and the intervenors attempted to appeal this
decision but discovered that there were no mechanisms for such an
appeal to the regional council or the Secretary of Commerce. An
attempt by the CDFG's Director to have the Pacific Council vote to
repeal their decision failed.
B. The Court's Opinion
After the Pacific Council's decision, the Vietnamese Fishermen
Association moved for summary judgment, seeking a permanent
injunction against enforcement of the ban on gillnetting for rockfish by
the CDFG.' In support of their motion, plaintiffs argued that the Pacific
Council's consistency determination should have resjudicataeffect in the
present action. Defendants countered with the claim that the opinion of
the regional council was merely advisory and not binding on the district
court. The court did not resolve this issue and proceeded to the merits
of the case.6
Plaintiffs' argument on the merits was that a state gill net ban in the
EEZ conflicts with, and is therefore preempted by, the Pacific Council's

64. For the reaction of both sides of the Proposition 132 debate, as related to this
case, see Ken Castle, Judge Blocks Part of New Gillnet Law: Injunction Against
Enforcement of Ban in Federal Waters, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Apr. 3, 1991, at A6.

65. In discussing the standard of review on motions for summary judgment, the
court states that "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's position is insufficient."

The question to be asked, according to the

court, is "Whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission
to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law."
Vietnamese Fishermen Ass'n of Am. v. Cal. Dep't of Fish & Game, 816 F. Supp. at

1473 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 479 U.S. 242, 251-252 (1986)).
66.

Judge Jenson, writing for the court, does state that, "a persuasive argument

can be articulated in favor of preclusion," even though, "the court will not rest its
decision on a finding of res judicata." Id. at 1474.
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Groundfish Plan.67 Agreeing with plaintiffs, the court saw Southeastern
FisheriesAss 'n v. Martinez, s Bateman v. Gardner,69 and State v. Sterl-

ing7' as providing the relevant rule of law. These cases were cited
approvingly in support of the proposition that, under the Magnuson Act,

state regulation is only allowed in federal waters when the state law does
not actually conflict with federal law.7' In examining the facts before it,
the court found such an actual conflict. The court reasoned that because
the federal plan expressly prohibits gill nets north of thirty eight degrees
north latitude, it implicitly authorizes the use of gill nets elsewhere.
Therefore, the court concluded that fishermen have a federal right to use
gill nets in federal waters south of thirty eight degrees north latitude. In
order for plaintiffs to comply with Proposition 132, they would have to
forgo that federal right.'

67. The court discusses three ways in which federal law may preempt state law:
First, Congress may expressly define the extent to which it intends to preempt
state law. Second, Congress may indicate an intent to preempt all state law in
a particular field of regulation. Third, federal law may preempt state law to
the extent that state law directly conflicts with federal law.
Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiffs claimed that both the first and third types of preemption
applied to Proposition 132. Judge Jenson says that the court need only look to the
conflict between the two laws (i.e. the third type of preemption) to make its decision.
The opinion, however, does mention the fact that the federal Plan expressly provides for
state regulations to be enforced in federal waters only if consistent with the Plan. Id. at
1474-1475.
68. Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n v. Martinez, 772 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
(state law attempted to limit the taking of mackerel in federal waters to an amount below
the federal quota. Court found state law preempted due to direct conflict with federal
law). This case was appealed and affirmed. See Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n v. Chiles,
979 F.2d 1504 (1lth Cir. 1992).
69. Bateman v. Gardner, 716 F. Supp. at 595. See supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
70. State v. Sterling, 448 A.2d at 785 (conflicting state provision imposing a
landing-possession limit on flounder preempted).
71. Vietnamese Fishermen Ass'n of Am. v. Cal. Dep't of Fish & Game, 816 F.
Supp. at 1474-1475.
72. The court rejects the argument that because compliance with the state
requirement is not actually a violation of the more lenient federal requirement, it is
possible to be in compliance with both. In its view, Martinez, Sterling and Bateman
recognize that "the possibility to comply with a more stringent state standard does not
resolve the conflict between state and federal law. In those cases, the more severe state
statutes were all stricken and federal law ruled federal waters." Id. at 1475.
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Intervenors' argued that the cases relied upon by the court and the
plaintiffs all involved a conflict between express federal language and
express state language. Here, they argued, the state has promulgated an
express rule, but the federal government has not. The federal statute,
according to intervenors, "may be interpreted as leaving to the sound
discretion of the state the decision of whether to allow gill nets south of
thirty eight degrees north latitude."74 The court rejected this interpretation as "miss[ing] the mark" and responded by merely reiterating its
former analysis, stating that "[d]espite the lengthy arguments and the
accompanying rhetoric, state law prohibits gill nets and federal law
permits gill nets south of thirty eight degrees north latitude in federal
waters. This conflict justifies preemption. "75
Intervenors also attempted to argue that Proposition 132 is consistent
with the purposes behind the Magnuson Act. The court responded by
stating that preemption may be based on either a state statute's direct
conflict with a federal law or the obstruction of federal goals and policies
by such a state law. Both need not be shown.76 The court also rejected
the intervenors' argument that it must apply a presumption in favor of
finding the state law valid because it is doing a preemption analysis in an
area of traditional state regulation. The court stated that such a
presumption did not apply here because offshore waters from three to
two hundred miles off state coastlines are considered areas of traditional
federal regulation.'
The court noted that its finding was consistent with that of the
Pacific Council. This body, vested with the authority to determine
whether a conflict between federal and state law exists, had determined
that Proposition 132 was inconsistent with the federal plan. The court
held that the Council's decision did not have resjudicata effect but was
entitled to deference because of the Council's careful deliberation.78 On
the basis of the court's preemption analysis as bolstered by the regional
council's decision, summary judgment was then granted to the plaintiffs.

73.

See supra note 63.

74. Id.
75. Vietnamese Fishermen Ass'n of Am. v. Cal. Dep't of Fish & Game, 816 F.
Supp. at 1475.
76.

Id.

77. The court further dismisses this argument by stating that, were it to apply
such a presumption, the state law in this case would still be preempted due to the "clear

language evident in the federal scheme." Id. at 1475 n.6.
78. Id. at 1476.
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IV. DISCUSSION

The latest in a line of cases with similar analyses,79 the court in
Vietnamese FishermenAss'n ofAmerica v. CaliforniaDepartmentof Fish
& Game prohibited the application of a strict state fishing regulation in
the EEZ. The court, seeing itself constrained by the preemption
doctrine, felt compelled to allow the federal plan to prevail. There are
two problems with the decision. First, by finding a conflict between
Proposition 132 and the MFCMA by implication, the court reduced the
role of state management in offshore fisheries unnecessarily. Second, the
court gave an unwarranted amount of authority to the regional council,
a decision-making body whose members may have serious conflicts of
interest, to define the scope of state offshore authority.
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, in cases cited by the
Vietnamese Fishermen Ass' of America court,' an actual conflict
between state and federal law arises when "'compliance with both federal
and state regulations is a physical impossibility' ... or when state law
'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.' '"81 When either of these two
things happen, both regulations cannot be enforced "without impairing
the federal superintendence of the field."' In Vietnamese Fishermen
Ass'n ofAmerica, the district court found such an actual conflict between
Proposition 132's enforcement in federal waters and the Pacific Council's
FMP.n However, that finding did not firmly rest on either of the two
bases for conflict as set out above by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The district court expressly denied that it was basing its finding of
preemption on the obstruction of the goals and policies of federal law by
the state law. It relied on the "direct conflict" between the state and
federal laws as the basis for preemption, refusing to address the
argument that Proposition 132 did not frustrate the "goals and policies"
of the MFCMA.84 As stated above, the authority cited for the proposi-

79. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
80. 816 F.Supp. at 1474-1475.
81. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. at 713
(1985) (citations omitted).
82. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
83. 816 F.Supp. at 1476.
84. Id. at 1475. "[1ntervenors claim that the intent behind the Magnuson Act is
consistent with Proposition 132. However, preemption may be based either on direct
conflict or the obstruction of the goals and policies of federal law ...
Plaintiffs need not
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tion that a direct, non-policy based conflict is enough for preemption
defines "direct conflict" as physical impossibility.' Yet, the court in
Vietnamese Fishermen Ass'n of America did not rest its finding of
preemption on physical impossibility.' It failed to explicitly analyze
how the conflict in the case "impair[ed] the federal superintendence of
the field," given that neither "physical impossibility" to comply with both
regulations nor incongruence between federal and state policies were
involved in the conflict.'
Given that the court did not make explicit its reasoning in enlarging
the concept of an "actual conflict," the decision itself seems somewhat
cryptic. Yet, in finding a "direct conflict," the court relied on cases that
explicitly rested their preemption analyses on the conflict between federal
fishing policies and state policies.88 In each case, restrictive state policies

demonstrate both." Id. (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
at 141-142 and Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n v. Martinez 772 F. Supp. at 1267).
85. Vietnamese Fishermen Ass'n of Am. v. Cal. Dep't of Fish & Game, 816 F.
Supp. at 1475 (citing Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n. v. Martinez, 772 F. Supp. at 1267).
The court could be redefining "physical impossibility." However, such an attempt
would not follow the very law cited as authority for the court's decision. In Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, if it is possible to comply
with a less restrictive state statute, the conflict between that statute and a more restrictive
federal one does not rise to the level of physical impossibility:
A holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no
inquiry into congressional design where compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility.... No such impossibility of dual
compliance is presented on this record.... As to those Florida avocados ...
which were actually rejected by the California test, ... the Florida growers
might have avoided such rejections by leaving the fruit on the trees beyond
the earliest picking date permitted by the federal regulations.... [Tihe present
record demonstrates no inevitable collision between the two schemes of
regulation, despite the dissimilarity of the standards.
Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. at 142-143.
86. 816 F. Supp. at 1475.
87. Id.
88. Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n v. Martinez, 772 F. Supp. at 1267-1268 ("[t]he
Florida regulation inhibits a primary purpose behind the promulgation of the Magnuson
Act, 'to promote domestic commercial fishing'") (quoting Bateman v. Gardner, 716 F.
Supp. at 598); Bateman v. Gardiner, 716 F. Supp. at 598 ("[o]ne purpose behind the
promulgation of federal Magnuson regulation was to promote domestic commercial
fishing.... The Florida statute stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of this
purpose by precluding Florida fishermen from participating in commercial shrimp fishing
in the disputed area"); State v. Sterling, 448 A.2d at 787 ("Although the state contends
that the [state] regulation does not present a conflict with federal yellowtail flounder
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were preempted by the federal government's goal to promote domestic

commercial fishing. The Vietnamese FishermenAss'n of America court
seems to be joining these other courts in holding that state regulations
which are more restrictive than existing federal management plans will
always be preempted because they upset the balance between management and commercial fishing as struck by federal regulatory bodies

whose regulations are supreme under the Constitution.
However, unlike previous cases, the court in Vietnamese Fishermen

Ass'n of America found a conflict, not between express state regulation
and express federal language creating a balance of interests, but between
express state language and an implied federal balance. When confronted

with the argument that a conflict by implication is an inadequate basis for
preemption, the court replied that it is not, without providing further
analysis. 9 The court simply stated that the implied conflict in the case
was adequate to preempt the state statute.' ° In a footnote, the court
refused to presume that the state law was valid and stated that the conflict

in the case was adequate to overcome such a presumption, even if
applied.91

The doctrine of preemption has not developed in a vacuum.
Constitutional concerns under the Supremacy Clause have been
historically balanced with other constitutional concerns, especially those
regarding federalism. The court in this case rejected a presumption that
was created by the U.S. Supreme Court to assure that the federal-state

policies, it is apparent that such a conflict does exist").
These decisions did not rest solely on policy-based grounds. In Bateman v.
Gardner, the court held that the Florida statute in question conflicted with a federal
fishery management plan and that, moreover, compliance with the state law would
frustrate the purposes of the Magnuson Act. To support the argument that the two
regulatory measures conflicted in a way that was separate from their policy differences,
the court cited State v. Sterling. Yet, the only ground for the Sterling court's decision
was that the state management would thwart federal yellowtail flounder policies. The
policy analysis done by the Sterling court seems to be the true rationale behind the
Bateman decision, just as it is the true basis for the Vietnamese FishermenAss'n decision.
The Martinez court quoted the Bateman analysis verbatim. Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n
v. Martinez, 772 F. Supp. at 1267-1268.
89. This analysis of the court's preemption discussion assumes the court's reliance
on the regional council's consistency determination. That factor in the decision will be
discussed below. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
90. Vietnamese Fishermen Ass'n of Am. v. Cal. Dep't of Fish & Game, 816 F.
Supp. at 1475.
91. Id. at 1475 n.6.

1995] Vietnamese FishermenAss'n v. Cal. Dep't of Fish & Game 271
balance would not be disturbed "unintentionally by Congress or
unnecessarily by the courts:"
Where ...
the field which Congress is said to have pre-empted has
been traditionally occupied by the States ...we start with the

assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to
be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress. 2
The court in Vietnamese FishermenAss'n of America held that this
presumption is inapplicable because waters from three to two hundred
miles offshore are areas of traditional federal management. However,
this argument is unconvincing, given the history of fisheries management. States have traditionally managed these waters, exercising "broad
residual regulatory power under the Tenth Amendment to promote the
health and welfare of the public."'
While Congress could have
preempted state authority at any time, it did not. Judicially-applied
preemption in this area, traditionally governed by the states, clearly
raises those concerns regarding the proper balance of federal-state power
behind the presumption articulated above.
The Vietnamese FishermenAss'n of America court also justified its
decision in favor of federal preemption by stating that the conflict in the
case, based on federal silence,-would overcome the above presumption,
even if applied. This argument is also unconvincing given that the
purpose of the presumption is to ensure that state laws in traditionally
state-managed fields are only preempted when federal intent to do so is
clear. In this case, the regional council's plan did not explicitly allow
the gear that California sought to ban. By finding preemption on the
strength of an implied conflict, the court unnecessarily discounted the
existence of state checks on federal power in areas traditionally regulated
by the states. This choice, in effect, severely restricted the authority of
an important actor in the management of the nation's fisheries at a time
when checks on an inadequate federal system are extremely important.
Many see the regional fishery management system as valuable, but
flawed. The MFCMA has been successfulin "Americanizing the
fisheries off the U.S. coasts." As reported to Congress by the Assistant
Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere in 1993, the foreign

92.

Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. at 715

(quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. at 525).
93. Greenberg & Shapiro, supranote 5, at 649.
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catch in the EEZ for 1991 was insignificant and, in 1992, there were no
foreign operations in the EEZ. 4 For domestic fisheries, the MFCMA
regime produced thirty-three management plans by 1993 and, as the
Assistant Secretary testified, "[m]ost of the commercially and recreationally important species are, or soon will be, under management."' Yet,
despite the existence of federal plans, "some important and valuable
stocks are crumbling. Of the one hundred fifty-six species or species
groups which have been assessed, forty-three percent of the total are
classified as 'overutilized' and thirty-nine percent are 'fully utilized.""
Problems with the present program of federal regulation prompted
much Congressional testimony in 1993-1994.1 Common complaints
focused on the make-up of the councils,9" potential conflicts of interest

within the councils,' the fact that the councils make both long-term
planning decisions as well as allocation decisions,"° and the difficulty

getting prompt regulatory decisions given the present, multi-tiered
decision-making structure. 10' There were also questions concerning the
management practices used by the councils. The "open access" system
presently employed was seen as leading to the overcapitalization of the

fishing industry."°

It was also alleged that the MFCMA's assumption

94. Reauthorizationof the Magnuson Fishery, Conservation, and Management Act:
HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Senate Hearings](statement of Douglas K.
Hall, Asst. Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, NOAA).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., id.
98. These criticisms were expressed in Senate and House hearings in 1993-1994.
See generally Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act - Part H, 1993:
HearingHouse Comm. on MerchantMarine andFisheries, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 House Hearings] and 1993 Senate Hearings, supra note 94. For
criticism on the make-up of the councils, see, e.g., 1993 House Hearings, supra at 12
(statement of Linda Johnson, Executive Director, "Do You Care?" Coalition).
99. See, e.g., 1993 House Hearings, supra note 98, at 52 (statement of W.F.
"Zeke" Grader, Jr., Executive Director, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's
Associations).
100. See, e.g., 1993 Senate Hearings,supranote 94, at 46 (statement of Dr. Ray
Hilborn, Professor, School of Fisheries, University of Washington) and id. at 76
(statement of Louis M. MacKeil, Jr., President, Cape Cod Salties Sport Fishing Club).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 11 (statement of Douglas K. Hall, Asst. Secretary of Commerce for
Oceans and Atmosphere, NOAA).
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that biologists can determine the optimum yield of a fishery"° will
inevitably lead to overexploitation. 1" Others point to the insufficiency
of the data used in council decisions" and the need of the MFCMA
mandate to conserve fishery habitat. 1"
These complaints embody the reasons that the council system has
failed to prevent the overuse of U.S. fish stocks. They demonstrate why
federalism concerns should be heavily weighed by courts when the
federal government has taken on the regulation of areas in which states
have legitimate interests. They illustrate the need for legislative reform
of the council system as well as the need for Congressional clarification
of state authority under section 306(a) of the MFCMA. These complaints also illustrate the possibility that the Vietnamese FishermenAss'n
of America court struck the wrong balance between the Supremacy
Clause and the federal system by eliminating state authority to check the
regional councils on the strength on an implicit conflict.
Of course, the court did not make its decision based solely on the
implied conflict. Its decision was strongly bolstered by the fact that the
Pacific Council had determined Proposition 132 to be inconsistent with
its fishery management plan. However, the regional councils are
inherently interested bodies because they represent various sectors
interested in the fisheries which they manage."° The perception that
council members have conflicts of interest is widespread."0 8 Further,
there is no mechanism for Secretarial review of the consistency
determination process." ° Yet, the court gave the Pacific Council's
consistency determination a high level of deference. It did this
considering neither the decision-making process involved nor the
concerns normally associated with giving an administrative body's

103. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (1988).
104. See, e.g., 1993 Senate Hearings,supranote 94, at 44 (prepared statement of
Dr. Ray Hilbom, Professor, School of Fisheries, University of Washington).
105. Id. at 62 (prepared statement of Mr. William S. "Corky" Pemet, Asst.
Secretary, Office of Fisheries, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries).
106. Id. at 64.
107. Id. at 141 (prepared statement of Joseph Bracaleone, Chairman, NewEngland
Fishery Management Council).
108. Id.
109. Vietnamese Fishermen Ass'n of Am. v. Cal. Dept. of Fish & Game, 816 F.
Supp. at 1473.
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determination preclusive effect."'

Had these things been considered, it

would have been clear that any factual determination by the Pacific

Council, as it currently exists, should be carefully examined by a
reviewing court.
Few calls for reform of the MFCMA have requested the abolishment

of the regional councils. Most ask that checks on council decisions
which might reflect conflicts of interest be carefully maintained.
Currently, there are two bills before the 104th Congress which seek to
correct the deficiencies in the current council system."' Both of these
bills attempt to put such checks in place and to make the decision-making
process of the councils more fair. For example, the House bill addresses
the fact that participation in the council process can only take place if the
public has notice of the meeting.'
It requires that the public be given

notice "sufficiently in advance of the meeting to allow meaningful public
4
participation.""' The bill also provides other procedural safeguards,"
including the postponement of any vote until the General Counsel of the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration resolves questions
regarding whether any member of the council must be recused due to a
financial interest in the vote." 5 In addition to dealing with concerns
regarding conflicts on the councils, both the Senate and House bills

110. These concerns include whether or not the administrative agency was acting
in a judicial capacity, complying with standards of "procedural and substantive due
process that attend a valid judgment by a court." Vietnamese Fishermen Ass'n of Am.
v. Cal. Dep't of Fish & Game, 816 F. Supp. at 1474 (quoting Paramount Transp. Sy.
v. Local 150, 436 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1971). See also United States v. Utah
Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966). These standards have been held to require
certain elements in a proceeding such as cross-examination, the right to subpoena
witnesses, and testimony under oath. Vietnamese Fishermen Ass'n v. Cal. Dep't of Fish
& Game, 816 F. Supp. at 1474.
111. H.R. 39, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995) available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
BILLS File; S.39, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
BILLS File.
112. H.R. 39, supra note 111, at § 8.
113. Id.
114. These safeguards include a provision requiring the minutes of each council
meeting to be kept accurately and requiring those minutes to be made available to any
court of competent jurisdiction. Id. This requirement would provide courts with a
record with which to examine determinations made by the council in cases such as
Vietnamese FishermenAss'n of Am. v. Cal. Dept. of Fish & Game. H.R. 39 would also
require disclosures of financial interest by members of the council to be kept on file for
the Secretary of Commerce's use in reviewing council actions. Id.
115. Id.
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redefine the factors to be considered by the councils, adding the
considerations of overfishing,116 destruction of fishery habitat, 7 and
reduction of bycatch,"' to the regional council's decision-making
calculus. These bills, designed to improve the determinations made by
the councils, should be seriously considered in light of recent judicial
developments giving the councils paramount authority to regulate the
nation's offshore fisheries.
V. CONCLUSION
The decision of the court in Vietnamese FishermenAss'n ofAmerica
v. CaliforniaDepartmentof Fish & Game unnecessarily eliminated the
authority of an important actor-the state-in the regulation of the
nation's fisheries. In doing so, it gave an inordinate amount of deference
to the Pacific Council's determination that this authority should be so
eliminated. In the absence of legislative reform placing checks on the
regional councils, improving their decision-making process, and clarifying state authority in the EEZ, court decisions such as this risk striking
an improper balance between constitutional concerns under the Supremacy Clause and the constitutional concerns of federalism and due process.

116. See, e.g., H.R. 39, supranote 111, at §9; S. 39, supranote 111, at§ 109.
117. See, e.g., H.R. 39, supra note 111, at §§ 3, 9; S. 39, supranote 111, at §
118.
118. See, e.g., H.R. 39, supra note 111, at §9 3, 7; S. 39, supra note 111, at 9

